How does compliance with Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) rulings on patient mobility in the new Member States compare to the old Member States? Studying new Member States' compliance practices would highlight the state of territoriality, the CJEU's effective influence and the European healthcare union's strength among the new Members. To provide a structured analysis and transferrable results, we compare Poland, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria with France and Germany. These countries are selected on the basis of commonalities in their systems' organization. For the results for the old Member States, we rely on Obermaier's 2009 "The End of Territoriality". This study is qualitative in nature and relies mostly on qualitative semi-structured interviews with experts from ministries of health, health insurers and legal experts from all three countries. We distinguish between formal and informal compliance and based on this, we advance an analytical framework for a systematic study of CJEU compliance across the EU. Our findings produce a heterogeneous picture of these countries, with all three of them demonstrating different modes of compliance. This is due to distinct domestic conditions, ranging from insurance fund amenability and national court complaisance to state administration obstinacy.
Introduction
How does compliance with Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) rulings on patient mobility in the new Member States compare to that of the old Member States? The central point of this study is to establish whether a factual adjustment of national legislation or of practice has occurred following the Luxembourg rulings on patient mobility. Subsequently, we seek to examine how compliance in the new Member States compares to that of the older Member States. Although we look into the reasons behind compliance and non-compliance in our cases, the focus is on establishing whether and, if so, how compliance has occurred.
To determine this, the present study offers an in-depth analysis of the institutional and legislative structures of the new Member States and how, if at all, these have changed following CJEU decisions. We will introduce the general structure of the healthcare systems of Poland, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria, and we will establish the compatibility of these systems with the broad principles codified by the CJEU. We are interested in the national responses to the line of rulings that starts with Kohll and Decker in 1999 through Elchinov in 2010 1 . These rulings have limited prior authorization as a formal requirement for outpatient treatments and established that the delivery of healthcare as a service is not bound exclusively to Member States' territories. In doing so, the CJEU has compromised the principle of territoriality, which reflects the mutual recognition of territory-based, supreme national rule (Obermaier, 2009, p. 34) . For this reason, CJEU intervention causes considerable legislative and procedural impediments to outright compliance by Member States.
Although particularly inimical in the sphere of patient mobility, in general, it is possible that CJEU rulings cause no conflict with national legislation. Therefore, we distinguish between nonresponse and non-compliance. Whereas non-compliance involves the lack of adjustment of conflicting national legislation, non-response represents Member States' reactions in the absence of said conflicting national legislation. That is, a Member State that has taken no action following a CJEU ruling is not necessarily in violation of European law. We are particularly interested whether the new Member States exhibit non-compliance. Consequently, our study delivers an in-depth legal and procedural analysis of our cases, and we specifically examine whether national legislation or practice expressing the principle of territoriality has been amended.
We conceptualize compliance with CJEU rulings as the formal or informal adjustment of conflicting national legislation or practice following CJEU decisions. In measuring compliance, we rely on a procedural classification of national responses to CJEU decisions and we identify five forms. These include outright non-compliance (wherein the Member States do not amend conflicting procedures or national legislation), procedural compliance (wherein procedures change but legislation does not), restrictive compliance (wherein Member States adopt the minimal legal requirements, usually maintaining onerous bureaucratic procedures), legislative compliance (wherein national legislation and procedure is changed to adopt CJEU principles entirely) and judicial compliance (wherein CJEU principles are adopted by national courts in cases against a non-compliant insurer or the national government). This analytical framework is presented in detail below.
To facilitate our study, we will compare our findings from Poland, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria with the results of a seminal work on compliance with patient mobility CJEU rulings in the old Member States. Andreas Obermaier's "The End of Territoriality? The Impact of ECJ Rulings on British, German and French Social Policy" is one of the most exhaustive studies of compliance in Germany, France and the United Kingdom (UK). We will not compare our cases to the UK because its healthcare system differs fundamentally from those in our cases, and its relevance is therefore limited.
We have selected our cases on the basis of their comparable healthcare models. All of them have moved away from the Soviet Semashko model in the 1990s and have subsequently adopted Bismarckian, Social Health Insurance (SHI), benefits-in-kind 2 systems, which makes an institutional comparison easier. None of the countries have a National Health Service (NHS), which is recognized by the literature to have greater difficulty following CJEU rulings than SHIs (Kostera, 2008, p. 28; Obermaier, 2009, p. 84 ).
This research is important for several crucial reasons. First, compliance with CJEU rulings on patient mobility in the new Member States is still understudied. In spite of the many publications addressing the old Members (Martinsen, 2005; Obermaier, 2008a; Wismar et al., 2011) , we do not know much about compliance practices among the new Members. This means we do not know much about the threat to territoriality, the influence of the CJEU and the strength of the European healthcare union (Vollaard and Martinsen, forthcoming) . Any threat to territoriality (i.e., mutual recognition of territory-based, supreme national rule) poses a threat to the established modes of state functioning. Therefore, CJEU compliance, which poses just such a threat, by codifying patient mobility rights, is critical to study. Additionally, the present study gives us the chance to examine the influence of the Court of Justice on the new Member States. The Court's influence is expressed as the extent to which certain principles or rule interpretations influence policy outputs, thus producing change (Martinsen, 2015, p.4) . If CJEU rulings are ignored and patients' rights are not properly enforced, Luxembourg's rulings have failed to produce change, and the reach of European judicial influence is effectively limited. Finally, before the adoption of the Cross-border Patients' Rights Directive 3 (CPRD), CJEU rulings were instrumental in the Europeanization of the healthcare sector (Martinsen and Vrangbaek, 2008, p. 181; Blauberger, 2014, p. 457) . However, as compliance with these ruling is not guaranteed (Greer, 2012, p. 277) and therefore not uniform, a problem arises about the key question of this special issue -if a European healthcare union is in the making, its strength obviously varies. Strength is understood here as commonality in standards, values, guidelines and legislation (Vollaard and Martinsen, forthcoming, p. 1) . If our cases did not comply with Luxembourg's rulings, the healthcare union's strength diminishes among them. Thus, our research stands to highlight the erosion of territoriality, the CJEU's influence and the European healthcare union's strength in three of the less researched new Member States.
The present study is a structured comparative case study. Our analysis is structured in that it relies on standardized, general questions for each of our cases (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 69) . These questions have been developed in order to best address the purpose of our study, i.e., determining the compliance with CJEU rulings of our cases. By using comparable, structured questions, our fieldwork has delivered comparable results for our cases and greater reliability. As a result, our research also qualifies as a focused study, as it has a pre-determined purpose to which our methodology is entirely dedicated. In collecting information, we predominantly rely on semi-structured interviews with experts from all three countries, which were supplemented with legal documents when relevant.
We have conducted live or email-based semi-structured interviews with ministry officials, healthcare and legal experts in all three countries as well as with representatives of health insurance funds, practitioners within the legal systems and patient organizations. By using different sources of information, we can achieve data source triangulation (Johnson, 1997, p. 285) , which considerably increases the reliability of the data. Cross-referencing the inputs from different actors ensures that the final findings of the study have been validated from several spheres of the healthcare sector. In the interviews, we specifically sought to highlight the form of compliance with CJEU rulings. Issues of the format of adjustment, either formal or informal, were particularly addressed.
Our findings reveal an intricate picture among these cases. We observe compliance in all three cases, but it differs in its format and its causes. Whilst the Czech Republic is a case of procedural compliance, in Bulgaria, we find judicial compliance, whereas in Poland, there is restrictive compliance. This pattern highlights idiosyncratic factors which go beyond the cases' historical and institutional commonalities. These include insurance fund amenability, national court complaisance and state administration obstinacy.
The paper proceeds in the following way. We will present the state of the art, emphasizing the key reflections on CJEU non-compliance reported in the literature and Obermaier's findings for France and Germany. On the basis of this review, we will present our analytical framework and position Obermaier's observations from Germany and France within our framework. This will lay the foundation for the juxtaposition of our own cases. We present these cases in the next section, which we begin with an institutional and legislative description. We will focus on how these fit with the CJEU's provisions on patient mobility. Then, we will present our findings, and we will place our cases within our framework. We begin with a concise review of the relevant literature.
State of the Art and empirical evidence from Germany and France
In the fourth wave of implementation research, the rift between quantitative and qualitative research has deepened, with the former delving deeper into directives' transposition, whereas the latter engaged with the issue of CJEU Member State relations (Treib, 2014, p. 13) . The measurement of Member States' compliance has been difficult because the Court's rulings address individual states, and their transferability is not always certain. These impediments accentuate the imperative role of a comprehensive legislative analysis and of an exhaustive conceptualization of compliance.
We conceptualize compliance as divided between two fundamental categories -formal (legislative) compliance and informal (procedural) compliance. Whereas formal compliance refers to factual amendment in national legislation, informal compliance is expressed in procedural changes made by the principle actors in the healthcare sector who can facilitate patient mobility without formal amendment of national legislation. These actors are, above all, the health insurance funds.
The distinction between formal and informal compliance reflects the fact that whilst formal compliance would be the most straightforward way to comply, it is not the only way to do so. Healthcare funds that establish procedures for reimbursement of medical costs incurred abroad can be just as successful in enforcing patients' rights.
Although they differ in their format, formal and informal compliance stem from the same considerations made by actors in the healthcare system. A rational analysis of the benefits and, more importantly, the costs associated with compliance seems to dominate actors' attitudes towards CJEU case law (Conant, 2002; Blauberger, 2014; Greer and Martín de Almagro Iniesta, 2014) . According to this logic, governments comply with CJEU rulings after rationally weighing the instrumental costs of compliance against the potential costs of non-compliance (Beach, 2005, p. 114) .
Whilst in the case of national governments, this calculation frequently highlights the loss of control over healthcare expenditures, sustainability, accessibility and quality (Baeten, 2011, p. 256) , the calculation for health insurance funds can look quite different. For example, the reaction to the 1999 Kohll and Decker rulings among German health insurers was rather welcoming. The German insurers perceived the potentially positive effects of the CJEU verdicts, i.e., stronger competition among care providers and, ultimately, financial relief (Obermaier, 2009) . As a result of this positive view, German health insurers began complying with CJEU rulings before national legislators introduced changes to national health insurance provisions (Obermaier, 2009, p. 107) . National legislation was subsequently amended in October 2003 to implement the CJEU case law (Obermaier, 2009, p. 116) .
The Court's rulings were received differently in France. After the Kohll and Decker rulings, the French funds and government "dragged their feet" for nine years before reaching legislative compliance. Paris had crucial concerns about the financial implications of increased patient mobility, fears over the erosion of established instruments for controlling healthcare consumption and the technical application of reimbursement for products that were unknown in France (Obermaier, 2009, p. 90) . However, the fact that national courts were willing to comply with the principles stipulated by the CJEU, conflated with enduring pressure from the European Commission in the form of infringement procedures, put considerable pressure on the French government to comply. By 2006, France ensured legislative compliance by creating a section titled "Health care treatment received abroad" in its Social Security Code.
Analytical framework
Our analytical framework is visually presented in Table 1 . It depicts the five possible options for compliance and organizes them according to the values of formal and informal compliance. The table shows that in addition to four combinations of high or low formal and informal compliance, there is also a fifth option, i.e., judicial compliance. We separate judicial compliance from procedural compliance because in these situations, patients sue either health insurers or the state for violations of their rights. Judicial compliance also differs from restrictive compliance in which the government meets the minimal legal requirements, making litigation unlikely. Although the major legal impediments are eliminated, patients still face burdensome bureaucratic procedures. For this reason, judicial compliance is a separate category in our framework. In this situation, neither the legislators nor the insurers have adopted the principles codified by the CJEU. These principles are, therefore, supported by national courts. If we consider compliance in Germany, we can conclude that prior to 2003, the country was an example of procedural compliance; subsequently, we observe legislative compliance. It is important to highlight that due to the myriad health insurance funds in the country (numbering over one hundred), procedural compliance was heterogeneous. This tells us a lot about the enforcement limitations of procedural compliance and accentuates the shortcomings of this development. Although it is preferable to non-compliance, procedural compliance is heavily conditioned by awareness among insurers and (as with national governments) a positive costbenefit analysis. Such a perception among health insurers is not guaranteed.
In the case of France, we can see that legislative compliance was significantly slower than in Germany but also that it was preceded by judicial compliance. The fact that national courts pressured the national government for years before legislative compliance took place provides much information about the importance of the governments' cost-benefit analyses. If the national administration's calculated cost of legislative compliance is prohibitively high, continuous litigation may be a more acceptable price.
The French case also exemplifies that, although slower, the adoption of CJEU principles by lower national courts can lead to the "judicialization of politics" i.e., a mode of politics wherein court rulings impact both politics and policy-making (Martinsen and Mayoral, forthcoming, p. 4) . We identify the judicialization of politics as the consequence of successful judicial compliance, that is, when continuous litigation from national courts carrying the principles established by the CJEU pushes national decision makers to amend national legislation to conform to said principles. However, the French example also shows that judicial compliance is not immediately successful in triggering judicialization of politics, and it might need support from additional factors, such as infringement procedures from the Commission or other push factors.
Although judicial compliance is indicative of at least some overall compliance, the depoliticized nature of judicial influence has drawn considerable criticism in the literature. Growing judicial influence has been widely recognized as a threat to democratic governments in Europe. Since the CJEU can deliver binding interpretations of European legislation, without the involvement of democratically elected governments, this causes concerns (Bellamy, 2008; Höpner and Schäfer, 2012; Kelemen, 2013) . The strong cooperation between the CJEU and lower national courts in Europe has been dubbed "Eurolegalism" (Kelemen, 2011) .
Nevertheless, constructive cooperation between the CJEU and national courts is one of the most effective ways for the European Union to ensure compliance where its resources are most scarce, i.e., within the Member States (Kelemen, 2006, p. 104) . Furthermore, although litigating may not be the greatest expression of democratic government, in a system that relies on democratically adopted legislation, adjudication (based on said legislation) to defend one's rights or to challenge bureaucratic malfeasance is every bit as legitimate a form of participation as voting (Kelemen, 2006, pp. 122-3) .
Democratic legitimacy, however, is not judicial compliance's greatest issue. This rests in the principle characteristics of courts as actors. As with all courts, the CJEU and national courts are reactive actors, i.e., they have no initiative of action, and depend on cases being brought to them by litigants. Therefore, the cases that the courts consider will invariably reflect the interests of those who have a major economic or personal stakes in CJEU compliance as well as the financial and organizational resources to pursue this course (Scharpf, 2010, p. 221 ). This means that impoverished patients who need treatments abroad are extremely unlikely to gain these through the national courts or the CJEU. Therefore, judicial compliance depends on litigants' resources and awareness of existing CJEU rulings. Otherwise, they are unlikely to seek their rights, and judicial compliance is unlikely to occur.
Having introduced our analytical framework and its theoretical underpinnings, we now turn to the analysis of our cases. Through these cases, we will seek to examine how the institutional characteristics of the Czech, Polish and Bulgarian systems fit with CJEU case law on patient mobility. We will need to establish whether there are conflicts between the principles established by Luxembourg and national legislation and to observe how Member States addressed these conflicts.
Empirical findings and analysis
The Czech Republic Like its Eastern counterparts, before the division of Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic operated a tax-funded national, Semashko healthcare model, with pervasive centralization and state ownership. Following the division of the country in 1993, a Social Health Insurance system with multiple health insurance funds was established. At their height in the 1990s, there were thirty such funds, but by 2015, there are only seven left.
The General Health Insurance Fund (VZP) covers half of the population. Originally, other funds were organized vocationally, but today, they are open to the general population.
The funds contract hospitals, clinics, ambulances and other facilities and cover the medical expenditures of their insured patients. The providers are operated by the state, regions, municipalities, companies (controlled by either private investors or regional and local governments) or individual practitioners.
Initially, it was expected that competition among insurers would lead to improved healthcare levels. However, mismanagement quickly led to the bankruptcy of several funds, which has necessitated stronger government involvement. As a result, revenues are redistributed to cover expensive pensioners, funds must follow the same policy, and contracts can differ in details only. Unsurprisingly, the transition to a single insurance fund model is debated, although many fear power concentration and highlight benefits of competition in public financing. Thus, the funds remain the principle actors responsible for planning.
The legal framework of the healthcare system is spread over several legal acts, but its obligations towards Czech insured patients are clearly stated. The Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, an annex to the national constitution, states in Article 31 that public health insurance shall assure that healthcare is free. Further details on the provision of healthcare are regulated by Act 48/1997 on Public Health Insurance (ZVZP), Act 372/2011 on Healthcare Services and Conditions of their Provision (ZZS) and other acts concerning funds and contributions.
In stark contrast to the Semashko system, the new system grants considerable mobility within the country. Article 47(5) of the ZZS stresses the referrals of registered providers -generalists, paediatricians, gynaecologists and dentists -to specialists or specialized departments in hospitals. In reality, however, this is voluntary. Competition among providers makes patient rejection unlikely. The funds do not penalize specialists for accepting patients without referrals. Therefore, no effective gatekeeping exists. Only expensive, specialized treatments are provided by licensed centres.
Mobility outside of the country is another story. Article 14 of the ZVZP states that healthcare is provided by national territory. This legal foundation of territoriality is substantiated by the functioning of the contract-based model. Czech patients have access only to contracted providers. Whilst this means that foreign providers are not technically excluded, they are actually rarely contracted. Burdensome requirements make this difficult and little cross-border cooperation has emerged despite initiatives within the good neighbourhood policy.
Despite these restrictions, Czech national legislation has been amended to accommodate European legislation following the 2004 accession of the country to the European Union. Regulations 1408/71 and 883/2004 rely on their direct effects, and their application has been managed by the Centre for Interstate Payments (CMU). These regulations have been the most widely used legislative mode for obtaining treatment outside of the Czech Republic, most notably in Germany.
Thus, CJEU case law has largely been ignored in the Czech Republic, with no national legislation being changed. Case law has not resulted in formal adjustment of statutes. The direct effect and supremacy (van Gend en Loos and Costa v. ENEL judgments) of treaty provisions on basic economic freedoms interpreted by the Court of Justice were perceived as sufficient. Therefore, formal compliance did not occur.
However, procedural changes have taken place and were in fact coordinated between the insurance funds and the CMU. In 2006, these actors agreed on a permissive approach to crossborder healthcare, which was specified in mutually agreed upon guidelines. Our interview with the director of the CMU, Ladislav Švec, revealed that cases were, however, extremely rare before 2010 (Interview CMU, 19.5.2015) . Until then, the insurance funds' statistics do not reflect them at all. In 2012, the CMU's Statistical Yearbook notes that there were only 4 cases, and 539 euros were reimbursed (CMU, 2012, p. 38), whereas in 2013, the same source highlights that there were 12 cases costing 5,133 euros (CMU, 2013, p. 38).
The CPRD was enacted with a six-month delay due to an internal cabinet crisis and early elections in 2013. By April 2014, there was a comprehensive amendment to the ZVZP. Article 14 is still present in the law, but because the principle of territoriality is not seriously enforced, an amendment to it did not appear necessary. The effectiveness of the new regulations is evidenced by the number of cases following the implementation of the CPRD. Since April 2014, 76 requests for reimbursement totalling over 16,000 euros have been submitted. Although these sums are still negligible for Czech health insurance funds, they are becoming cautious regarding further patient liberalization. They have unsuccessfully lobbied for broader application of prior authorization, and the dominant fund, the VZP, has been overtly discouraging patients from obtaining planned healthcare abroad. This disapproval is expressed by highlighting the prohibitive prices of treatments obtained abroad and by emphasizing the need for referrals in order to receive reimbursement. Courts have remained uninvolved in the application of CJEU patient mobility rulings in the country.
Although requests for reimbursements are expected to increase in 2015, overall, the population is happy with the quality of the healthcare system, and there is much more interest in obtaining treatment in the Czech Republic among foreign patients than vice versa. Requests from Slovak patients for reimbursement have multiplied, according to interviews with officers of the dominant Slovak health insurance fund (Interview Slovak Health Insurance Fund, 17.9.2014). The Czech healthcare system is apparently also attractive to Polish patients seeking to avoid waiting lists.
Poland
In 1998, Poland established a social health insurance system with compulsory participation and universal coverage after the transition from Communism in 1989. The stewardship, management and financing functions are divided between the Ministry of Health, the National Health Fund (NFZ) and regional governments. The NFZ is the sole payer and manages the process of contracting health services with public and non-public service providers. The Ministry of Health is responsible for formulating national health policy; financing long-term public health programmes; and selecting highly specialized medical services, major capital investments and medical science and education. The territorial autonomous governments (regions) are responsible for assessing the health needs of their respective populations, planning health services delivery, health promotion and managing public health care institutions. The scope of the benefits package and the level of insurance contributions are defined in national-level legislation.
General practitioners (GPs) act as gatekeepers to the health system, and patients can freely choose to register with any primary care physician contracted by the NFZ. Since 1999, patients have had the right to choose among contracted providers for specialized care upon referral. In practice, almost all patients choose the closest primary care physician or hospital.
Access to providers in other European Union (EU) countries for planned procedures was introduced by national legislation and procedural documents by the NFZ in 2005. The change was the result of the necessity to harmonize the standards of the unified European Market and the patients free movement rule and health services provision (Kowalska, 2006, p. 4) (Kowalska, 2006) 4. These rules established a procedure for prior authorization, which could be granted if waiting times in Poland were very long or if a particular treatment was not offered.
Examples of the latter include highly specialized treatments, such as proton radiotherapy for brain cancer (Email Interview, University of Krakow, 5.5.2015) . The procedures for applying for prior authorization are relatively bureaucratic and place the burdens of seeking information and providing translated documents, among other requirements, on the patients. Patients must also pay costs such as travel and food expenses when traveling abroad for treatment. Neither the NFZ nor the Polish government has been very active in publicizing this right, and consequently, few patients know of the option and very few have used it. Statistics on the issue are not readily available, but according to figures provided by the NFZ, there were 200 cases in 2009, including referrals for highly specialized care (Sagan et al., 2011, p. 53 ). In contrast, over 75,000 Poles were treated in EU/EFTA States (mainly in Germany) in that year, according to EU social security coordination rules (EC No. 883/2004 and EC No. 987/2009) . At the same time, more than 107,000 foreigners were treated by Polish health care providers (29% of these patients were from Germany) (Sagan et al., 2011, p. 53) .
Poland considered the legislative change and related procedures from 2005 to be adequate implementation of the CJEU rulings (Kowalska, 2006; Baeten, 2012) , (Email Interview Polish Ministry of Health, 6.5.2015; Interview Jagellonian University, 23.4.2015) . Therefore, no further legislative changes were adopted to accommodate CJEU rulings until the implementation of the CPRD.
In the judicial arena, it is possible to find cases in which regional or national Polish courts refer to CJEU rulings. However, the courts have upheld the position that the Polish administration of "prior authorization" was acceptable and have supported the decisions of NFZ to deny access. None of these cases have been referred to the CJEU. The Polish courts have thus supported restrictive implementation by the NFZ and the national authorities.
Poland was one of the countries that voted against the CPRD, as it was considered a serious threat to the governability of the Polish health care system. Funding for outpatient treatment in other EU countries was a concern, but Polish authorities expected these costs to remain relatively low. The main reason for voting against the CPRD was the fear that reimbursing care provided by non-contracted care providers abroad, would lead to citizen demands to be reimbursed for care by non-contracted domestic healthcare providers. Furthermore, it was feared that the relationships among the insured citizens, public payer, statutory health insurance, and private health insurance would be affected (Budzyńska, 2008; Baeten, 2012; Vasev and Vrangbaek, 2014) .
The formal legislative change in 2004 and the adoption of a rather bureaucratic and onerous procedure for seeking prior authorization, combined with restrictive practices and support for this in the judicial system, makes Poland a case of restrictive compliance. Legislation and procedures have been adopted, and some citizens have used these to seek treatment abroad. However, this practice is not actively promoted, and the relatively bureaucratic procedure combined with the demands of paying all indirect costs makes treatment abroad infeasible for the majority of Polish citizens. Furthermore, Polish courts have not challenged these restrictive practices.
Bulgaria
The Bulgarian healthcare system moved towards a Bismarckian model at the end of the 1990s when it instituted a single national health insurer, the National Health Insurance Fund (NZOK). It collects social insurance contributions, which are paid cooperatively by both employers and employees at an 8 per cent rate (60:40 ratio, respectively). The NZOK reimburses contracted health providers for medical treatments defined on a yearly basis in the national health insurance package. To gain access to these treatments, Bulgarian patients need a referral from their GP. Thus, the GP plays a central role in the rationing and management of healthcare provision in the country.
Although the entire system is managed by a single health insurance fund that grants patients considerable mobility within the country, it is used to limit their movement outside of it. Because the NZOK contracts providers around Bulgaria, a patient from Sofia could chose to go to a specialist in Varna, if they wished. However, if the patient wants to leave the country, for either in-or outpatient treatment, they need an authorization from the head of the NZOK. This is stated in Article 36 of the Law for Health Insurance (ZZO): "Insured citizens have the right to receive partial or complete reimbursement of their expenses for treatment abroad only when they have received prior authorization from the National Health Insurance Fund". This article summarizes the principle of territoriality in the Bulgarian system, allows the NZOK to control the outflow of patients and clearly violates the principles codified in CJEU case law.
This violation came to light in the Elchinov case (C-173/09). In this case, Mr. Elchinov was diagnosed with a malignant oncological condition in his right eye. The standard procedure applied in Bulgaria is removal of the eye. To avoid this, Mr. Elchinov searched for treatments abroad and found that his condition can be treated with proton therapy at the University Hospital Charité in Berlin. Mr. Elchinov handed in all of his documents for his application to the NZOK, but while waiting for a reply, his condition deteriorated and he left for Germany. He received treatment there before the official reply was received from the NZOK. Upon returning to Bulgaria, the NZOK issued the opinion that because "the treatment concerned was not provided in Bulgaria, the Fund decided to refuse Mr. Elchinov's application" (Backes and Eliantonio, 2010, p. 6) . At that point, Mr. Elchinov was forced to question the opinion of the NZOK in court.
After circulating in the Bulgarian court system, the case was finally put forward to Luxembourg. In October, 2010, the CJEU decided that Article 49 of the Treaty of the European Community and Article 22 of Regulation 1408/71 preclude Member State legislation that allows the refusal of reimbursement in all cases with respect to hospital treatment given in another Member State without prior authorization. As a result, the NZOK was required to repay the 25,000 euros that Mr. Elchinov had spent on his operation.
In its decision, the CJEU referenced multiple rulings on the issue of patient mobility (Kohll/Decker, Vanbraekel, Inizan, and Watts). The fact that such an obvious violation of European law was referred to Luxembourg for interpretation clearly indicates that the court's practice is not familiar among the Bulgarian legal practitioners.
The Elchinov case decision was cited in at least eight further cases. As a result, the NZOK has been ordered to pay an additional 14,431 Euros to successful litigants. This information was retrieved from the database of the High Legal Council. It is possible that there are more cases because the database's search functionality is subpar. It is worth noting that none of the subsequent rulings cite Kohll and Decker or any of the other CJEU patient mobility rulings. Furthermore, all of the subsequent cases revealed by our search were from courts in Sofia. Although, it is possible that there are other cases that we did not find due to technical impediments, it is obvious that the awareness of CJEU case law varies across the country and is greatest in the capital.
Our interviews in Bulgaria revealed a rather mixed picture of the Bulgarian legal elite's work with Luxembourg case law. The perceptions of judges are rather bureaucratic and apathetic: "The mania to deliver rulings, and to finish cases quickly, at any cost, leads to the judge's unwillingness to dig in, to refer cases, to substantiate his motives with additional EU legislation" (Interview Nr: 43, University St. Kliment Ohridski, 2014) . At the same time, however, Bulgarian judges are among the most active in referring cases to the CJEU. Since 2007, Bulgarian judges have referred 65 cases for preliminary rulings, more than any other new Member State. The majority of these are from the Administrative Court Sofia.
Our contact from the Ministry of Justice summarized this contradictory picture by concluding that, although there are good practitioners in Bulgaria, among the judges, the prevailing attitude is maintaining the legal status quo. This is not done in rejection of Luxembourg's authority but rather due to the extra work that referring cases and following CJEU practice would (Interview Nr: 47, Ministry of Justice, 2014 ). An interviewee from the Administrative Court Sofia, expressed similar, although more favorable, concerns about the judges' performance and workload (Interview Nr: 46, Administrative Court Sofia, 2014) .
In spite of the direct interpretation of Article 36 by the court in Luxemburg, the article remained in the ZZO until 2014 when it was finally removed as part of the reform of the law for the transposition of the CPRD. This speaks clearly of the fact that Bulgaria constitutes a strong case of judicial compliance. Although the Elchinov verdict was delivered in 2010, Article 36 remained in the national legislation until it had to be removed due to the CPRD.
Conclusion
The Eastern European cases we consider here exhibit three of the compliance patterns we lay out in our analytical framework. The Czech Republic, Poland and Bulgaria demonstrate examples of procedural, restrictive and judicial compliance, respectively. We have systematized compliance behaviours in Figure 1 5 . As we can see, none of our cases had achieved full legislative compliance, prior to the transposition of the CPRD.
As the old Member States we considered here, France and Germany, did achieve legislative compliance, we must conclude that the Eastern European Members have enacted patients' rights in a less complete manner and that the CJEU's influence within the new Members (as far as patient mobility is concerned) is weaker. However, we must also highlight that in the older Member States, additional push factors facilitated legislative compliance but these were absent among the new Members.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, the European Commission received numerous complaints from French citizens about restrictive national legislation (Obermaier, 2009, p. 91) . This created pressure from the Commission, which lasted even after the legislative changes in 2006 and continued until the infringement procedure from 2008 (C-512/08) wherein the European Commission put before the court France's new provisions and questioned their compatibility with the Vanbraekel ruling. In Germany, a large part of the government's willingness to comply legislatively with the CJEU case law stemmed from an ongoing national healthcare reform process. The Court's subsequent rulings, after Kohll and Decker, fine-tuned the case law and narrowed down the impact in order to ensure uniform application (Obermaier, 2008b, p. 32) . This made the case law compatible with the principles of the Health Insurance Modernization Act, and conflated with backing from the insurance funds, the government saw no reason to avoid compliance.
Such factors did not play a role in our cases. Although they shared institutional characteristics in the past and multiple organizational commonalities in the present, the Eastern European Member States' approach to CJEU case law on patient mobility has been surprisingly divergent. An important organizational feature that might play a role here is the distinction between multiple and single health insurance fund structures. In the Czech Republic, we see procedural compliance as in Germany prior to legislative compliance in the latter. This speaks to the important role of health insurance funds in evaluating CJEU rulings beyond the protectionist perspective seen in single health insurance fund systems. In spite of this, we see that even among the multiple funds systems studied here, none opted for legislative compliance straight away.
In Poland, even though cases were referred to the national courts, restrictive compliance, i.e., minimalist change in national legislation, meant that the courts had no foundation to rule in favour of patients. This highlights the importance of referring cases to the CJEU and of referring to CJEU case law and emphasizes the cooperation between national courts and Luxembourg. If the former are not willing to collaborate with the court, the CJEU's effective influence is circumscribed. We see that this is not the case in Bulgaria. Due to the Elchinov ruling, a single case has led to a string of national rulings defending patients' rights. In the absence of procedural or restrictive compliance in Bulgaria, national courts have introduced at least some enforcement of the CJEU principles.
The fact that, as we can see from Figure 1 , none of the cases opted directly for legislative compliance, speaks clearly to the strong prevalence of territoriality in the studied systems (Vollaard, forthcoming, p. 2) . This underlines the cost-benefit analysis to which compliance is subject and the prohibitively high cost of outright legislative compliance. As a result, European healthcare systems are much more likely to "drag their feet", comply partially, and only achieve legislative compliance when additional push factors are in place, e.g., pressure from the European Commission or concurrent domestic reform.
Beyond the insurance fund amenability, national court complaisance and state administration obstinacy factors mentioned above, our research has highlighted intricate domestic factors that catalysed the observed responses. In Poland, respondents from the Ministry of Health emphasized the importance of economic control over the system as well as the lack of a culture of compliance with non-binding EU rules. This resulted in minimalist changes to national legislation, accompanied by onerous bureaucratic procedures, i.e., restrictive compliance. We also see some of this Polish reasoning in the Bulgarian case. An expert from the National Coordination Mechanism, a body that coordinates the synchronization of national and European legislation, highlighted the considerable amount of the acquis communitaire and the urgency to comply primarily with regulations and directives. There was no clear awareness of Bulgaria's obligations vis-à-vis Luxembourg's decisions, and they were therefore neglected. This resulted in non-compliance, which was challenged in the courts and led to judicial compliance. The domestic picture in the Czech Republic is entirely different. Luxembourg's case law was well known in the country even before accession to the EU. Several articles summarized emerging judgments in journals for hospital lawyers and managers, and CJEU rulings were presented at conferences on medical law. Ultimately, however, relative satisfaction with Czech healthcare quality, in combination with negligible numbers of patients interested in treatment abroad and rapidly rotating healthcare ministers (who were barely informed about this marginal phenomenon), kept legislative compliance off the political agenda. Procedural compliance was facilitated by the insurance funds, but there was never a stronger push to facilitate legislative compliance. Our findings exemplify both the conceptual complexity of CJEU compliance and that adherence to Luxembourg's rulings does not occur solely in the legislative format. Our analytical framework reflects the fact that besides legislators, practitioners and courts can be effective enforcers of CJEU rulings.
In conclusion, CJEU compliance in our cases was not uniform and was weaker than among their Western European counterparts. The countries' homogenous institutional structures and common historical developments did not result in a congruent erosion of territoriality, which has remained more intact than in Germany and France (as these countries have achieved legislative compliance). Territoriality has indeed diminished, but it has done so in a varying manner that follows domestic idiosyncrasies. These have proven paramount to compliance obligations and have conditioned Luxembourg's fluctuating influence and the variegated strength of the European healthcare union. The CJEU's influence triggered some change, but in our cases, this did not lead to legislative compliance. The Court's limited influence has had correspondingly limited success in achieving greater commonality in healthcare standards, values, guidelines and legislation. Therefore, if we can speak of a European healthcare union, its strength in our cases dissipates. Against this background, we can conclude that compared to the old Members, in the new ones, CJEU rulings aren't nearly as successful instruments for curtailing national territoriality or institutionalizing a strong European healthcare union. 
